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Abstract 
This paper studies the extent to which social networks influence the employment 
stability and wages of immigrants in Spain. By doing so, I consider an aspect that has 
not been previously addressed in the empirical literature, namely the connection 
between immigrants’ social networks and labor market outcomes in Spain. For this 
purpose, I use micro-data from the National Immigrant Survey carried out in 2007. The 
analysis is conducted in two stages. First, the impact of social networks on the 
probability of keeping the first job obtained in Spain is studied through a multinomial 
logit regression. Second, quantile regressions are used to estimate a wage equation. The 
empirical results suggest that once the endogeneity problem has been accounted for, 
immigrants’ social networks influence their labor market outcomes. On arrival, 
immigrants experience a mismatch in the labor market. In addition, different effects of 
social networks on wages by gender and wage distribution are found. While contacts on 
arrival and informal job access mechanisms positively influence women’s wages, a 
wage penalty is observed for men. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The immigrant population in Spain has largely increased over the past decade, from 
2.3% of the total population in 2000 to 10% in 2007. This large immigration inflow has 
turned Spain into the second largest recipient of immigrants after Germany in the 
European context (OECD, 2010). The social relevance of this new phenomenon has 
turned the immigration process into a key subject of social and economic research. 
Different studies have focused on the assimilation process and occupational mobility of 
immigrants in Spain (Izquierdo et al., 2009; Alcobendas and Rodríguez Planas, 2009, 
Simón et al., 2011). However, less attention has been paid to the role of social networks 
on immigrants’ behavior. 
Empirical and theoretical studies point out the influence of social networks in 
various areas of social and individual behavior, such as labor market performance, 
education attainment, and crime among others (Jackson, 2008; Wahba and Zenou, 
2005). The social network literature highlights two mechanisms that could affect 
individual behavior: information and norms (Bertrand et al., 2000). The first channel 
refers to how a person’s knowledge depends on the behavior of others. The second 
channel emphasizes how a person’s preferences may depend on the behavior of others, 
either directly by affecting taste or indirectly via social pressure. Both mechanisms 
stress how nonmarket interactions can influence aggregate outcomes. 
In this paper, the focus is on the effects of social networks on the job quality an 
immigrant finds, mainly because social and economic integration largely depends on an 
immigrant’s labor market outcomes. The social network literature agrees on the positive 
impacts of strong and weak ties on the rate at which jobseekers receive employment 
offers.
2
 Moreover, the quality of the members of the network influence the quality of the 
job an immigrant could find (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004). Moreover, that 
strong dependence on the social network could isolate immigrants from the native 
population and from the organizations and institutions in the host country. In the long 
run, immigrants’ enclaves may develop, reflecting social and economic disintegration. 
Despite the growing empirical literature, no consensus on the impacts of social 
networks on job quality has yet been reached (Ioannides and Loury, 2004). Dustmann et 
                                                          
2
 Close or strong ties refer to the strength of the network. Close ties include family and friends, while 
weak ties are expressed in terms of a lack of overlapping in personal networks between any two agents 
(e.g. professional acquaintances). 
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al. (2010) show that through referrals, social networks reduce informational deficiencies 
in the labor market, leading to better quality matches between workers and firms. Some 
authors argue that immigrants with social resources obtain more advantageous 
occupational positions, as friends and relatives sort through jobs to reserve the better 
ones for their network’s members (Aguilera and Massey, 2003; Nee and Sanders, 2001). 
Conversely, Bentolila et al. (2010) find that worker/job matches tend to be poorer for 
jobs found through the network. In a similar line, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) point out 
that job matches depend on the strength of the network. They argue that mismatch 
happens if social networks are based on close ties because relatives and friends are 
unrelated to the individual’s previous experience or training. Instead, good matches can 
happen if job information is transmitted through professional affiliations. 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze to what extent social networks 
affect immigrants’ labor market outcomes in terms of employment stability and wages 
in Spain. First, I study the impacts of social networks on the probability of keeping the 
first job. An immigrant’s social networks are measured through contacts on arrival, 
participation in social organizations, and a proxy of network size, measured as the 
proportion of immigrants of the same origin country living in the same Autonomous 
Community on the total immigrant population in the Autonomous Community. Further, 
I consider informal and formal job access mechanisms.
3
 Then, the effects of social 
networks on wages are estimated for immigrants who keep their first jobs. A wage 
equation is estimated through both ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile 
regressions (QRs) controlling for sample selection bias. In this case, a separate analysis 
is conducted for women and men. 
For this purpose, this paper uses the National Immigrant Survey (ENI, its 
Spanish acronym), a single and unique cross-sectional national representative survey on 
immigration carried out in 2007. The richness of this dataset relies on the retrospective 
information contained, especially on individuals’ labor market characteristics at three 
moments in time: before arriving in Spain, upon arrival, and at the moment of the 
survey. 
The results show that social networks have statistical and significant effects on 
employment stability and wages. The probability of keeping the first job decreases for 
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 Formal sources of information include state and private employment agencies, newspaper 
advertisements, union hiring halls, and school and college placement services. Informal sources refer to 
referrals from employees and employers, direct inquiries by jobseekers, and indirect ones through social 
connections such as family and friends. 
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immigrants who have contacts on arrival and for those who used a social network to 
obtain the first job. Conditional on finding the first job through social networks, the 
probability of keeping the first job increases for immigrants with close ties relative to 
those without close ties. Finally, different effects of social networks on wages by gender 
are found. Wage premiums are observed for women who obtained the first job through 
personal contacts or those who had contacts on arrival, while wage penalties are 
observed for those men that either had close ties or obtained the first job through social 
networks. In addition, conditional on having obtained the job through social networks, 
women with close ties present a wage penalty relative to those without close ties. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it contributes to the literature by 
estimating the extent to which the mechanisms through social networks affect the 
employment stability and wages of immigrants living in Spain. To my knowledge, this 
is the first paper that studies the relationship between social networks and employment 
on one hand, and the effects of social networks on wages on the other, of immigrants 
living in Spain. Second, I exploit a novel methodology for the study of social network 
effects on wages through QRs with sample selection bias in a semi-parametric fashion 
using a two-step procedure similar to that suggested by Heckman (1979). Finally, the 
richness of the ENI, with retrospective information on individuals’ labor market 
characteristics and histories, enables me to address the potential unobserved 
endogeneity problem controlling for labor status and last occupation in the origin 
country. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces 
the empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the data and provides summary statistics for 
the key variables of interest. Sections 4 to 6 present the results of the analysis. Finally, 
the last section concludes. 
 
  
4 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
 
This section presents the empirical approach and identification strategy. The analysis is 
conducted in two steps. First, I study the effects of social networks on the probability of 
keeping the first job obtained in Spain (Section II.1.). Second, I analyze whether wage 
differences could arise for immigrants who maintain their first jobs due to the presence 
of close and weak ties and job access mechanisms (section II.2.). 
 
II.1. PROBABILITY OF KEEPING THE FIRST JOB 
 
First, I analyze the impact of social networks on the quality of the job matching process 
for immigrant workers. A “good” match is considered if the skills and qualifications of 
the worker are those required for the job. Then, if a good match between employers and 
employees takes place, a longer duration of the worker in the same job is expected. 
Duration models require information on contract job duration. Unfortunately, the 
required information is not provided by the ENI. Therefore, as an alternative to these 
models and based on the information contained in the ENI, the quality of the matching 
process is studied through the probability of maintaining the first job in Spain relative to 
not keeping it, namely relative to being employed in a different job, being unemployed, 
or being inactive.
4
 
Other studies analyze the quality of the job match through a comparison of the 
last occupation in the country of origin and the occupation obtained in the country of 
destination (Mahuteau and Junankar, 2008), or by studying occupational mobility in the 
host country, comparing the first occupation and the actual occupation in the host 
country (Simón et al., 2011). However, this approach excludes from the study those 
immigrants that (i) do not have previous labor experience in the country of birth and (ii) 
those immigrants that despite having previous experience in the country of birth and a 
first job in Spain are actually unemployed or inactive. Therefore, the definition of the 
job matching process considered in this paper includes those immigrants that after 
                                                          
4 An individual is classified as “maintaining the first job” if he or she declares that the actual job is the 
first obtained in Spain. Specifically, the ENI (2007) asks for actual labor status in Spain. If the individual 
declares being employed, then he or she is asked if this is the first job obtained in Spain. If the answer is 
“yes”, the individual is considered to currently be in the first job. Conversely, if he or she answers 
negatively, then I consider he or she has had a different job since arrival.
 
Employment stability is 
observed if the immigrant is employed in the first job obtained in Spain. 
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having a first job in Spain are now unemployed or out of the labor market, thereby 
reflecting a bad match. 
The hypothesis to test is that the probability of keeping the first job is affected 
by immigrants’ close ties and weak ties as well as the job search mechanisms used to 
obtain the first job in Spain. Depending on the relationship found between social 
networks and employment stability (positive or negative), this would reflect the positive 
or negative impact of social networks on the quality of the job matching process 
between workers and employers. 
To assess the relationship between social networks and labor market status I use 
the following multinomial logit regression: 
 
         
           
           
 
   
 
 
where          is the probability of observing the         outcome of the 
dependent variable   conditional on the vector   of independent variables.    is the 
vector of regression coefficients to be estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
In this study, the key dependent variable ( ) measures four possible labor market 
statuses, namely being employed in the first job obtained in Spain, being employed in a 
different job, being unemployed, or being inactive.
5
 The independent variables of 
interest are the immigrant social networks in the host country and job access 
mechanisms for the first job.
6
 
I consider different measures of the strength of immigrants’ networks. Close ties 
is a dummy variable that refers to whether the immigrant had at least one relative or 
friend on arrival in Spain. As Goel and Lang (2011) point out, this makes network 
strength exogenous to the individual’s subsequent labor market experience. The other 
two measures used in the literature refer to weak ties: participation in social 
organizations distinguishing those devoted exclusively to immigrants and those not, 
while the proportion of immigrants of the same country of birth living in the same 
                                                          
5
 Inactive means those immigrants actually studying or involved in non-waged household activities, 
excluding retirees. 
6
 The mechanisms considered are formal methods and social networks. The translated question of the ENI 
(2007) reads: By what means did you obtain your first job? Respondents can choose many options, one of 
which is through family, friends, or other contacts. Throughout this text, network jobs and having 
obtained the first job through social networks are used interchangeably, as are formal jobs and having 
obtained the first job through formal channels. 
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region of the total immigrant population in the region is a proxy of network size 
(Munshi, 2003; Wahba and Zenou, 2005; Kahanec and Mendola, 2008).
7
 Because the 
ENI is only representative at the national level, the Municipal Register (Padrón 
Municipal de Habitantes) for 2007 was used to calculate the proportion of immigrants 
by country of birth in the different Autonomous Communities of Spain of the total 
immigrant population in each Autonomous Community.
8
 
Besides the key variables of interest, the vector of independent variables   
includes socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, region of origin, 
region of residence, educational attainment, legal residence authorization), migration 
experience (internal migration in Spain), and first job characteristics in Spain (such as 
activity sector and occupation). In addition, variables referring to immigrants’ labor 
market statuses and occupations in the country of origin are included. These variables 
are included in order to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity. In this sense, 
identifying the effect of social networks is difficult because unobserved individual 
attributes can be correlated with employment status or the quality of the job found. 
Therefore, the estimated effect could be biased and may not be attributable to a network 
effect. To deal with potential endogeneity I use the retrospective information available 
in the ENI. 
 Another source of concern could be sample selection. Because the individuals 
considered in this analysis are those with some experience in the Spanish labor market, 
sample selection bias could arise. In order to correct for this problem a two-step adopted 
Heckman procedure for logistic regression is implemented, which consists of a two-step 
estimator and a maximum likelihood estimator (Durbin and Rivers, 1990). In the first 
step, the probability of having any experience in the Spanish labor market is estimated. 
The probability that an individual has worked is modeled as a function of individuals’ 
socio-demographic characteristics, social networks, internal mobility, and motives for 
migration. From this equation, the Mills ratio is estimated. The second step estimates 
the probability of those immigrants in the labor market being in one of the four 
outcomes stated before but including the correction coefficient (obtained through the 
Mills ratio) as an additional covariate. 
                                                          
7
 Social participation in both kinds of organizations is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
individual participates in a particular kind of organization (exclusive or not to immigrants) and zero 
otherwise. 
8
 An Autonomous Community is a first-level political and administrative division of Spain. 
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The source of identification that appears in the selection equation but not in the 
second equation includes two dummy variables, which refer to migration motives: 
family regrouping and labor motives.
9
 On one hand, individuals migrating for family 
reasons may be less prone to work (as they are expected to engage in non-remunerated 
household activities). On the other hand, given that they have at least one family 
member when arriving in the host country, it may be easier for them to access job 
information. In addition, previous studies show that immigrants could have different 
labor market outcomes depending on the reason for migration (Jasso and Rosenszweig, 
1995; Aydemir, 2011), reinforcing the exclusion restriction used in this study. In 
particular, for the Spanish case, Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012) find that Moroccan 
immigrants who declare regrouping motives are less prone to work than are immigrants 
declaring labor motives. 
Furthermore, migration motives are not expected to affect quality of job match 
or employment duration. In formal terms, a good job match depends on workers’ 
supply-side efforts, the number of workers offering those services in the job market, and 
the demand for their skills and qualifications. Clearly, having good educational 
qualifications or prior work experience favors a good job match. For immigrant 
workers, language proficiency and years living in the destination country are also 
important issues. Reinforcing this exclusion restriction, Aydemir (2011) shows in the 
Canadian context that immigrants’ labor market outcomes highly depend on their skill 
levels and on the transferability of those skills rather than visa categories. 
 
 
II.2.  WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AMONG IMMIGRANTS WHO KEEP THE 
FIRST JOB 
 
Next, I test whether wage differences could arise between immigrants who maintain 
their first jobs due to the strength of an immigrant network and the job access 
mechanisms used to find the job. The hypothesis to test is that conditional on keeping 
                                                          
9
 The ENI contains self-reported information on the reason for migration, namely due to the presence of a 
family member or labor motives. As the question in the ENI allows for multiple responses, regrouping 
motives considers those immigrants that declare family reunion as a motive for immigration, although 
they could state another motive for migration. Labor motives is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the immigrant declares job searching or looking for a better job as a motive for migration. Further, 
migration motives were interacted with the region of origin and gender variables in the first equation and 
did not change the final estimations obtained. 
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the first job in Spain, wage differentials could occur between those who found the job 
through formal or informal methods and between those with or without close and weak 
ties. The effect of social networks on wages is still a controversial issue in the empirical 
literature. While Bentolila et al. (2010) find a wage penalty for those workers who 
found their jobs through personal contacts, Pellizari (2010) shows that the use of social 
networks can lead either to a wage premium or to a wage penalty in different EU 
countries. The study of social networks effects on wages consists of estimating a wage 
equation of the following type: 
 
(1)                                            
 
where    is the hourly wage,    is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i used personal 
contacts to find the first job, and    is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual had contacts 
on arrival. An interaction term between    and    is included.     , represents the 
proportion of immigrants of the country of origin of individual i living in region j of the 
total immigrant population residing in region j.     is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
individual participates in social mixed organizations, while   is a set of demographic 
and socio-economic controls and   is a column vector with the parameters of the 
equation. 
Equation (1) is estimated by OLS and QR. QRs, introduced by Koenker and 
Bassett (1978), estimate the conditional quantile function, namely models in which the 
quantiles of the conditional distribution of the response variable are defined as functions 
of observed covariates.
10
 QRs are used because OLS implicitly assumes no important 
differences in terms of the impacts of the exogenous variables along the conditional 
distribution. Instead, if exogenous variables influence the parameters of the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable other than the mean, then the analysis that 
disregards this possibility will be severely weakened. Unlike OLS, QR models allow for 
a full characterization of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, bringing 
much value added if the relationship between the regressors and independent variables 
evolves across its conditional distribution. This flexibility has thus far been precluded 
from social networks’ effects on wages in empirical studies, which has left unaddressed 
                                                          
10
 Similar to the OLS method, the parametric QR can be presented as the solution to a minimization 
problem. In this case, the asymmetrically weighted value of the residuals is considered to compute the 
parameters. For more details, refer to Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Koenker and Hallock (2001). 
9 
 
the possible impact of social networks upon inequality through its within-levels 
inequality component. 
Because the sample is restricted to those immigrants still employed in the first 
job obtained in Spain, sample selection bias could emerge.
11
 The methodology followed 
to address this issue is similar to the one proposed by Heckman (1979). This study is 
conducted separately for women and men in order to account for the different factors 
that may influence wages by gender.
12
 First, I estimate the probability of keeping the 
first job in Spain (the selection equation), while second the wage equation regression is 
estimated. The source of identification included in the selection equation but not in the 
wage equation includes number of children at home, marital status, and last occupation 
in the origin country. The first two variables are standard in the literature of 
participation in the labor market, while the last has been shown to influence 
employment stability (see section IV) and be relevant in determining job mobility 
(Simón et al., 2011). Moreover, all variables in the selection equation are related to the 
probability of keeping the first job and unrelated to current wages, since wages strongly 
depend on actual labor market conditions in the host country and on a worker’s human 
capital endowments. 
The conventional Heckman correction method is applied to the OLS estimation. 
However, an analysis of the distribution of the error term in the selection equation is 
needed for QR because the conventional Heckman correction method assumes a 
standard normal distribution of the error term in the selection equation. If this 
assumption is violated, then semi-parametric methods should be applied to estimate the 
first equation, because this method does not rely on a distributional assumption 
(Buchinsky, 1998). 
 
The wage equation with semi-parametric correction for sample selection bias is 
estimated following Buchinsky (1998). The QR equation is: 
 
 (2)                                      
                                                          
11
 The sample is restricted because the ENI (2007) only provides wages for actual employment and does 
not provide information about the mechanisms through which the worker obtained the job. On the 
contrary, information on job access mechanisms is only given for the first job in Spain. As the aim of this 
study relies on both wages and job access mechanisms, the sample is restricted to those who keep the first 
job obtained in Spain. 
12
 As the literature on the participation of women in the labor market points out, women’s decisions to 
participate have important implications on their wages. 
10 
 
 
The vector    is a set of observable characteristics that may affect the probability that an 
individual maintains the first job obtained in Spain. The term          corrects the 
selection at the θth quantile. Buchinsky (1998) suggests the following: 
 
                                         
   ,  
 
where      is the inverse Mills ratio defined as   
    
    
, while      and      are the 
density and the c.d.f. of a standard normal variable, respectively. 
 
The two-step semi-parametric method can be summarized as follows: 
1. Estimate the probability of not changing the first job using the semi-parametric 
index proposed by Klein and Spady (1993). 
2. Estimate the parameters in the QR including an approximation of the selective 
term as stated by Buchinsky (1998). 
 
 
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
This study uses the National Immigrants’ Survey (ENI, its Spanish acronym), a single 
and unique cross-sectional national representative survey on immigration conducted so 
far only for 2007 by the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas). 
The sample is based on the Municipal Register. In total, the original survey comprises 
15,441 individuals.
13
 The ENI offers information on socio-demographic characteristics, 
migration experience, social networks, and labor market experience.
14
 In particular, it 
features detailed information on activity condition before migration and at the moment 
of the survey and retrospective information on employment (e.g. occupation and activity 
sector) at three times: in the country of origin, first job on arrival, and current job in 
Spain. In addition, information on the finding methods used for the first job (social 
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 A response rate with respect to the effective sample eligible respondents of 87.4% was obtained. 
Interviews were conducted face-to-face, and for those informants unable to fill out the questionnaire in 
Spanish, a telephone line was set up (in Arabic and English). 
14
 More detailed information on the design and contents of the ENI can be found at 
http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/inmigrantes/inmigra_meto.pdf. 
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networks or formal methods) and income (amount of money an employee receives after 
all deductions), among others, is provided. 
The original sample was restricted to immigrants that arrived in Spain after 
1996. This constraint prevents selection bias in the analysis for different reasons. As 
Borjas (1985, 1995) states, cross-sectional estimates of immigrant performance in the 
host country could induce selection bias due to “cohort effects”, namely changes in the 
composition or “quality” of immigrants arriving at different points in time or because of 
nonrandom return migration or migration to a third country.
 
In addition, the business 
cycle could affect the results of labor market entrants and bias the estimation (Aslund 
and Rooth, 2007).
15
 Considering the period between 1997 and 2007 minimizes these 
effects. Simón et al. (2011) also stress that during this period immigrant flows into 
Spain were relatively homogeneous in relation to their regions of origin. Further, the 
authors point out that the economic growth and strong job creation observed in this 
period reduce the effects of the economic cycle on immigrants’ labor market situations 
and the importance of return migration relative to economic downturns. 
This analysis only considers immigrants with labor market experience in Spain, 
between 14 and 64 years old at the time of the survey, and older than 13 and less than 
57 years at the time of arrival. This selection excludes immigrants who finished their 
studies in Spain and focuses only on those who emigrated directly from their countries 
of birth to Spain. This leads to a final sample of 6,432 observations (9,009 observations 
were dropped). 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the selected sample and for different 
immigrant groups. As can be seen, most immigrants come from Latin America (52%) 
followed by immigrants from Eastern Europe (26%), are on average 34 years old, and 
have around four years of residence in Spain. In terms of educational attainment, more 
than half of immigrants have at least a secondary level education, while approximately a 
quarter of the sample reports a tertiary education level. Region disparities arise when 
focusing on gender composition, educational attainment, and social network 
endowment. For the whole sample, there are more women than men (51% versus 49%), 
but immigrants from Asia, North Africa, Western Europe, and the rest of the world are 
predominantly men. Immigrants from North Africa, Asia, and the rest of the world are 
                                                          
15
 The literature addresses this issue through creating synthetic cohort of immigrants by tracking specific 
immigrant waves across decennial Censuses or across Current Population Surveys (Borjas, 1994). In the 
present study, the approach considered is analogous, since the ENI is a single cross-sectional database 
with a 10-year period of analysis. 
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less educated (28%, 31%, and 32%, respectively have a primary education level). More 
than 80% of immigrants from Latin America and Eastern Europe declare having 
contacts on arrival compared with those from Western European countries (75%). 
Conversely, Western European immigrants participate more in mixed organizations 
(18%), three times that for North African immigrants. Social participation in non-mixed 
organizations is relatively low for all groups, but immigrants from Asia and the rest of 
the world more than double the sample mean (14%, 17%, and 6%, respectively). 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for immigrants’ first job characteristics 
in Spain. Around 80% of the immigrants that arrived between 1997 and 2007 have 
worked in Spain. More than 70% of them obtained their first jobs through social 
networks. Approximately 31% remain in their first jobs, while more than 50% have 
changed jobs. About half of these workers were first employed in non-skilled 
occupations and a quarter in administrative jobs. The main activities in which 
immigrants are involved in the first job are household activities, construction, and 
agriculture. Finally, regarding the occupational mobility of immigrants, it is worth 
noting that 35% of managers at the country of origin are employed in unskilled 
occupations in Spain, while the case is similar for professionals (36.6%). Workers from 
Western European countries experience less downward mobility relative to immigrants 
from other regions (Table A.3 in Appendix). This effect is explained in the literature 
because of the limited transferability of human capital between countries from non-
developed European countries and the Spanish labor market (Simón et al., 2011). 
 
 
IV. PROBABILITY OF KEEPING THE FIRST JOB IN SPAIN 
 
Table 3 presents the probability of having some labor experience in Spain (the first step 
in Heckman’s method for binary models). Relative to the key independent variables, 
contacts on arrival increase the probability of having some labor experience. However, 
network size or social participation in any kind of organization has no impact on the 
likelihood of having some labor experience. Being a woman, being married, the number 
of children in the household, tertiary education level attainment, belonging to a North 
African country, and declaring family regrouping as a motive for migration are all 
negatively related to the probability of having some experience in the Spanish labor 
13 
 
market. By contrast, years living in Spain, having legal residence authorization, having 
migrated for labor motives, and belonging to an Eastern European or a Latin American 
country all positively influence the probability of having some labor experience. A 
positive effect is also observed relative to internal migration in Spain. 
The estimated multinomial regression after controlling for sample selection is 
shown in Table 4.
16
 Because the coefficients obtained through the multinomial logit 
model do not measure the effect of the explanatory variables on the outcome probability 
directly, I focus on the results reported in Table 5, which shows the average marginal 
effects of the independent variables on the probability of each of the four labor statuses 
from the multinomial logit model. 
First, the probability of keeping the first job decreases on the following 
variables: close ties (9.1 percentage points), having a first network job (7.9 percentage 
points), and social participation in a non-exclusive immigrant organization (more than 
12 percentage points). On the contrary, conditional on having obtained the first job 
through social networks, immigrants with close ties increase by 8.3 percentage points 
the likelihood of keeping the first job in comparison to not having close ties. Further, 
network size raises the probability of keeping the first job by almost 20 percentage 
points. Second, close ties are associated with a 5.3 percentage point increase in the 
probability of being employed in a different job. First job access mechanisms, network 
size, and social participation in mixed organizations do not affect the probability of 
changing jobs. 
Third, immigrants who have had a first network job are more prone to being 
unemployed (4.9 percentage points). Contacts on arrival, social participation in mixed 
organizations, and network size do not influence the likelihood of unemployment. For 
those immigrants with more years living in Spain and those who participate in social 
mixed organizations, the probability of unemployment decreases by 1.5 percentage 
points. Finally, a positive effect of close ties on the probability of being inactive is 
observed (3.5 percentage points), while immigrants with a first network job and with 
close ties are less prone to being inactive relative to those with a first network job and 
without close ties. 
While the primary interest of this study is on social networks, a brief look at the 
results of the control variables is shown. The results reported in Table 5 are consistent 
                                                          
16
 All the results of the multinomial model are interpreted in relation to the omitted labor status: being 
employed in a different job from the first one obtained in Spain. 
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with previous findings in the literature. For example, being a woman increases the 
probability of unemployment or being inactive. Immigrants from Western Europe 
perform better in the Spanish labor market in comparison with other immigrants groups, 
while they are also more prone to keeping the first job and less prone to being 
unemployed. Negative and statistically significant effects of human capital endowment 
on the probability of being unemployed are further found. Immigrants with tertiary level 
education decrease by 3.4 percentage points the probability of being unemployed, while 
proficiency in the Spanish language decreases by 2.1 percentage points unemployment 
likelihood. Tenure in Spain decreases by 4.9 percentage points the probability of 
keeping the first employment. Furthermore, it increases by 4 percentage points the 
probability of job mobility. Having legal residence authorization increases the 
probability of changing jobs and decreases the likelihood of unemployment. Regions of 
destination have different impacts on labor status outcomes. 
In addition, last occupation in the country of origin shows that skilled workers 
are more prone to changing the first job obtained in Spain and are less likely to being 
unemployed. Internal mobility in the Spanish territory also reduces the likelihood of 
unemployment. Being a manager or a qualified worker in the first job (in relation to 
being employed in an unskilled occupation) or being occupied in any sector except 
agriculture is positively associated with maintaining the first job. The sector of the first 
job, namely the construction, trade, or hotel sectors, also increases the probability of 
unemployment. In addition, those unemployed in the country of origin are more prone 
to being currently unemployed. Finally, immigrants who took less than a month to find 
the first job are less likely to keep it, showing that upon arrival workers prefer to 
quickly accept a job. 
These results confirm the existence of a relationship between social networks 
and employment stability. Further, this relationship is negative for close ties and 
informal search channels for finding the first job. Conditional on having found the first 
job through social networks, immigrants with personal contacts upon arrival are more 
prone to keeping the first job compared with immigrants without close ties.
17
 In light of 
the hypothesis stated, these findings could reflect a mismatch in the labor market for 
immigrants on arrival, showing that upon arrival immigrants prefer to quickly accept a 
job offered through a social network, even if it is not the most suitable given their 
                                                          
17
 A separate analysis was conducted for women and men. The results did not differ significantly on the 
key independent variables by gender. 
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education, training, or previous experience. This finding is reinforced by the negative 
coefficient of the time spent searching the first job. Those workers who spent less than a 
month looking for their first employment are less likely to keep the job and are more 
prone to change it. Once established in the host country, immigrants search for a new 
job more in accordance with their levels of education, previous experience, and training. 
It can also be stated that the social capital accumulated by the network is restricted to a 
particular segment of the labor market, in which case the new immigrant’s job prospects 
are limited to this segment. 
Similar conclusions are presented in Bentolila et al. (2010) for the US and 
Europe. According to these authors, workers have a natural talent for a specific 
occupation, which may not be the one to which their social contacts can provide 
referrals. In this scenario, workers may have to accept a trade-off; they may find it 
advantageous to find a job more quickly through their social networks, but they may 
also work in an occupation that does not maximize their productivity. The results are 
also in line with those presented by Simón et al. (2011) and Veira and Stanek (2009). 
Both studies find a U-shaped pattern in terms of occupational mobility for immigrants 
in Spain, characterized by occupational downgrading on arrival and a gradual 
improvement as the duration of residence in the host country increases. In addition, 
Veira and Stanek (2011) find ethnic niches in the Spanish labor market. 
 
 
V. SOCIAL NETWORK EFFECTS ON WAGES 
 
V.1. Women’s case 
 
Before equation (1) is estimated, I control for the possible selection bias arising from 
selecting workers that keep their first jobs in Spain. The source of identification that 
appears in the selection equation but not the wage equation includes number of children 
at home, marital status, and the last occupation in the origin country (see section II.2).  
The selection equation is first estimated using a standard probit model (Table 6). 
After probit regression, the hypothesis of the normality of the residuals is rejected 
(Table 7); hence, the selection equation is estimated using the semi-parametric estimator 
proposed by Klein and Spady (1993) (Table 8). Then, keeping the first job is positively 
associated with age, being from Asia or the rest of the world, having had a first job in 
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the household sector, and never having worked or having been unemployed in the origin 
country. Conversely, age squared, number of children in the household, tenure in Spain, 
being from Latin America, North Africa, or Eastern Europe (in comparison with 
immigrants from Western Europe), having close ties, and having had a skilled 
occupation in the origin country (relative to unskilled occupations) all negatively affect 
the probability of keeping the first job in Spain (Table 6). 
Table 8 reports the estimations of equation (1) by QR and OLS. The effect of 
social networks on wage differentials is only observed in the first quantile of the 
distribution. A wage premium is observed for women who used personal contacts to 
find the first job (10.1 log points) relative to those who found the first job through 
formal channels. In addition, women with close ties earn 10.8 log points more than 
women without close ties. The interaction term between close ties and network job is 
negative and statistically significant, showing that wages in network jobs are 15.6 log 
points lower for women with close ties than for women without close ties. Moreover, 
wages decrease with network size; this is observed in all quartiles of the distribution but 
is only statistically significant in the first quartile (more than 24 log points). Finally, 
immigrants participating in mixed organizations do not present wage differentials in 
comparison with those not participating in these organizations. 
In the case of the estimates of the control variables, the results reported in Table 
8 are in the direction one would expect. Immigrant women from Latin America, North 
Africa, and Asia present an increasing wage penalty over the wage distribution in 
comparison with women from Western Europe. Second, wage differentials are observed 
within the Spanish territory. Women living in Aragon, Cantabria, and Castilla La 
Mancha earn less than women residing in Madrid, while a positive effect on wages is 
observed for women living in Balears, Catalonia, and Rioja. Compared with immigrants 
with no residence authorization, those workers with legal residence authorization earn 
more. Moreover, wage premiums are observed for women with more years living in 
Spain and for those women employed in professional occupations. These effects can be 
observed for all quartiles of the distribution. Finally, the sector also influences wage 
differentials. A negative effect is observed in the first quartile and at the mean of the 
distribution for women employed in the household sector. On the contrary, women 
involved in trade activities or construction earn more than those working in the 
agriculture sector. 
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These results show the importance of social networks on wages, which are only 
statistically significant for the first quartile of the distribution. The positive impacts of 
close ties or the use of social networks as a job access channel could reflect the fact that 
women involved in low skilled occupations and more vulnerable sectors benefit from 
their social networks. However, network size penalizes wages in the first quartile of the 
distribution. In summary, social networks increase women’s wages, but when the strong 
presence of immigrants from the same country of origin is observed in low occupational 
categories, this could indicate the presence of immigrant enclaves and, therefore, 
segmentation in the labor market, which results in wage penalties. In turn, this strong 
dependence on social networks may indicate a lack of access to formal institutions in 
the Spanish labor market. 
 
V.II. Men’s case 
 
Before equation (1) is estimated, I control for the possible selection bias arising from 
selecting men workers that keep their first jobs in Spain (see section II.2). The selection 
equation is first estimated using a standard probit model. After probit regression, the 
hypothesis of the normality of the residuals is not rejected (Table 7), hence, a standard 
probit model is used to estimate the selection equation. Table 9 shows the results for the 
estimation of equation (1) for the men’s analysis. In this case, the Heckman correction 
term is not statistically significant and thus no bias arises due to sample selection (Table 
9). 
Negative and statistically significant effects of close ties on wages are observed 
in the second and third quartiles of the wage distribution (12.3 log points and 12.2 log 
points, respectively). Workers employed in a network job earn less than workers that 
obtained their jobs through formal methods. This result is also observed for the first two 
quartiles of the wage distribution. Weak ties, network size, and social participation in 
non-exclusive organizations only penalize wages in the second quartile of the 
distribution. Conversely, workers in network jobs with close ties have higher wages 
relative to workers in network jobs without close ties (7.4 log points for the second 
quartile and 14.4 log points at the mean distribution). 
The expected results are obtained for the other control variables. A wage 
premium is associated with age, tertiary education level, proficiency of Spanish, legal 
residence, and years living in Spain. In addition, being employed in skilled occupations 
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positively affects wages, increasing along the wage distribution, as does being 
employed in the construction sector or in business services for the median and third 
quartile (relative to the agriculture sector). 
In summary, these findings reflect the fact that wage differences exist by gender 
among workers with and without ties and relative to first job access mechanisms. First, 
working in a network job or having personal contacts on arrival increases women’s 
wages in the first quartile of the distribution. Conversely, men employed in a network 
job earn less than those working in a formal job. Second, for immigrants working in a 
network job, wage differences are observed for those workers with close ties relative to 
those without close ties. This effect is positive and statistically significant for women in 
the first quartile of the distribution, while it is negative for the second quartile of the 
distribution in the men’s case. Third, social participation in non-exclusive immigrant 
organizations only penalizes men’s wages in the second quartile of the distribution, 
while network size penalizes both women’s and men’s wages. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this paper was to analyze the extent to which social networks influence 
immigrants’ employment stability and wages in Spain. The findings reported in this 
paper indicate that having contacts on arrival, social participation in mixed 
organizations, and having obtained the first job through personal contacts are all 
negatively related to keeping the first job. The opposite effect is observed for 
immigrants with a first network job and with close ties in comparison to those with a 
first network job and without close ties as well as for the proportion of immigrants from 
the same country of origin living in the same Autonomous Community. In addition, the 
time taken to find the first job (less than a month) reduces the probability of keeping it. 
Second, the presence of close ties increases the probability of changing 
employment or being inactive. Workers with a first network job are more prone to being 
unemployed than those with a first formal job. For immigrants with a first network job, 
those with close ties are less prone to being inactive than immigrants without close ties. 
These results suggest that a mismatch takes place in the labor market for 
immigrants on arrival. Immigrants tend to quickly accept a job offered through a social 
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network, even if it is not the most suitable job given their levels of education, training, 
and previous experience. Once established in the host country, however, immigrants 
search for another job more in accordance with their human capital endowment. 
Third, variables that account for human capital endowment such as education 
level, Spanish proficiency, and previous labor experience in skilled occupations in the 
country of origin all reduce the probability of being unemployed. In addition, the region 
of origin of the immigrant is an important factor that determines subsequent labor 
outcomes. Immigrants from Western European countries are more prone to keeping the 
first job and are less likely to being unemployed in comparison with immigrants from 
other regions. 
Finally, different effects of social networks on wages by gender and wage 
distribution were found. Close ties or informal job access mechanisms increase 
women’s wages in the first quartile of the distribution, but penalize men’s wages in the 
first and second quartiles. Further, conditional on having obtained the job through social 
networks, women with close ties present a wage penalty relative to those without close 
ties, while the opposite results are found for men. Social participation in non-exclusive 
immigrant organizations only penalizes men’s wages in the second quartile of the 
distribution, while network size penalizes both women’s and men’s wages. 
In summary, two main factors influence immigrants’ labor market outcomes. 
First, their great reliance on personal contacts as a job access mechanism is reflected in 
a mismatch in the labor market. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) argue that job mismatch 
could happen because jobs found through relatives and friends are often unrelated to the 
individuals’ previous experience or training. This great dependence on social networks 
may also reflect segmentation in the host labor market as well as a lack of access to host 
labor market institutions. Second, immigrants with low endowments of human capital 
are more likely to be unemployed or employed in low skilled occupations. 
In light of these results, some considerations must be made. First, it is important 
to stress that policies whose objectives are to accelerate the assimilation process or 
improve the labor market outcomes of immigrants not only have to focus on the 
individual (such as improving human capital endowments), but might also influence 
individuals’ social backgrounds and the social networks within which an individual is 
embedded. In this sense, it is commonly observed that individuals’ behavior is affected 
by that of their peers (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009). Second, the adaptation process of 
immigrants to labor institutions should be addressed. Third, the actual economic context 
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of high unemployment in Spain, especially concentrated in low productive sectors and 
with a high concentration of immigrant workers, requires actions to improve the 
endowment of human capital in order to increase immigrants’ productivity and job 
mobility in higher added value sectors.  
Lastly, this study could be improved if information on the quality and size of the 
network were available in the ENI. This information would allow a better 
characterization of immigrants’ social networks and a better comprehension of the 
mechanisms through which they operate. 
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. Sociodemographic Variables by region of origin (means values) 
 
Western 
Europe
Latin 
America
Eastern 
Europe 
North 
Africa
Asia 
Rest of
 the world
Total
Variables
Female 0.47 0.59 0.57 0.28 0.35 0.27 0.53
Man 0.53 0.41 0.43 0.72 0.65 0.73 0.47
Age 36 34 33 33 33 33 34
Age^2 1410 1251 1174 1130 1142 1119 1224
Year of arrival 2002 2002 2002 2001 2001 2001 2002
Years since arrival 4 4 4 5 5 5 4
Married 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.50
Number of children 0.89 1.49 1.02 0.98 1.09 1.15 1.25
Residence authorization 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Educational level attained (dummies variables)
Primary level 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.18
Secondary level 0.50 0.58 0.67 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.57
Tertiary level 0.36 0.23 0.20 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.24
Speaks spanish 0.64 0.98 0.64 0.55 0.39 0.50 0.80
Migration between municipalities. Frecuency (%)
1. Never moved 40.69 21.12 23.57 27.23 32.12 25.41 24.12
2. Moved once 29.65 39.99 37.59 30.99 28.47 34.05 37.31
3. More than one 29.65 38.88 29.65 41.78 39.42 40.54 38.56
Motives for migration
1
Labor motives 0.13 0.51 0.68 0.28 0.22 0.50 0.64
Family regrouping 0.40 0.31 0.27 0.39 0.48 0.30 0.27
Social networks
Contacts at arrival (Close ties) 0.75 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.76 0.58 0.83
Social participation (exclusive for immigrants) 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.06
Social participation (mixed organization) 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.10
Frecuency (region of birth) Subsample (%) 7.18 51.82 26.06 9.93 2.13 2.88 100.00
Observations 3644 6059 2386 2018 437 643 6432
1. More than one motive could be chosen. The options given in the ENI (2007) are: being unemployed, search for a better job, 
quality, family regrouping, politic motives, religious motives, others. Labor motives includes being unemployed or search for a 
better job.
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Table 2 Descritpive Statistics. Labor outcome in Spain 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Labour experience in Spain 7377 87.19
Dependent variables
Frecuency (%)
Maintain first job 6432 29.71
Actual job different first job 6432 53.73
Unemployed 6432 9.87
Inactive
1
6432 6.70
Job access mechanisms
Social Networks 6432 0.70 0.46
Formal methods 6432 0.29 0.46
Occupation
Manager 6432 0.01 0.11
Professional 6432 0.06 0.24
Paraprofessional
2
6432 0.27 0.44
Skilled workers
3 
6432 0.18 0.39
Unskilled workers 6432 0.48 0.50
Sector of activity
Agriculture 6432 0.16 0.36
Industry 6432 0.08 0.27
Construction 6432 0.15 0.36
Trade 6432 0.07 0.25
Hotel sector 6432 0.15 0.35
Transportation 6432 0.03 0.16
Business services 6432 0.06 0.24
Education- Health 6432 0.06 0.24
Household activities 6432 0.25 0.43
Public administration 6432 0.00 0.06
Manager 6432 0.04 0.21
Professional 6432 0.17 0.37
Paraprofessional
2
6432 0.27 0.44
Skilled workers
3 
6432 0.24 0.43
Unskilled workers 6432 0.12 0.33
Never worked at origin 6432 0.15 0.35
Jobs proposal before migration 6432 0.16 0.37
Less than one month 6432 0.40 0.49
Between 1 and 3 months 6432 0.19 0.39
Between 4 and 12 months 6432 0.17 0.37
More than one year 6432 0.04 0.21
Not known 6432 0.03 0.17
First job characteristics (dummy variables)
1. Inactive excludes those immigrants thar are retired.
2. Includes administrative workers, comercial salers, personal service workers.
3. Includes cualified workers employed in industrial or agricultural activities.
Last occupation in the country of birth (dummy variables)
Time before finding the first job (dummy variables)
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Table 3. Probability of labor experience and being actually participating in the Spanish labor market. 
Logit regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient SE
Independent variables
Close ties 0.707*** (0.167)
Social participation in non mixed organizations 0.167 (0.241)
Social participations in mixed organizations -0.111 (0.202)
Migrant proportion 0.619 (0.663)
Female -1.021*** (0.133)
Age 0.255*** (0.041)
Age^2 -0.003*** (0.001)
Years since arrival (years) 0.335*** (0.035)
Residence authorization 0.825*** (0.143)
Secondary level 0.097 (0.166)
Terciary level -0.320* (0.172)
Speaks spanish 0.983*** (0.152)
Married -0.485*** (0.129)
Number of children -0.193*** (0.051)
Eastern Europe 1.381*** (0.242)
Latin America 0.731*** (0.210)
North Africa -0.535** (0.231)
Asia -0.166 (0.426)
Rest of the world -0.322 (0.375)
Moved once 0.744*** (0.155)
More than once 1.069*** (0.161)
Motives for migration
Labor 1.418*** (0.138)
Family regrouping -0.811*** (0.133)
Constant -5.829*** (0.742)
Observations 7377
Pseudo R2 0.379
Standard error s in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Educational level attained (reference: primary level or less)
Region of origin (reference: Western Europe)
Internal mobility (reference: never moved)
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Table 4. Multinomial regression (base outcome: employed in a different job) 
 
First 
employment 
actual job
Unemployed Inactive
First 
employment 
actual job
Unemployed Inactive
Close ties (CT) -0.484*** -0.080 0.598* -0.465** -0.156 0.647**
Network job (NJ) -0.335 0.526* 0.418 -0.302 0.470* 0.463
CT*NJ 0.399* -0.101 -0.753* 0.382 -0.001 -0.786*
Migrant proportion 0.999* -0.286 -1.168 1.104** -0.300 -1.090
Social participation in mixed organizations (SP) -0.711** 0.419 0.024 -0.691** 0.495 0.038
SP*years 0.110 -0.147 0.002 0.105 -0.160 -0.003
Years since arrival (years) -0.286*** -0.060* 0.018 -0.274*** -0.053 0.030
Female 0.252** 0.691*** 2.239*** 0.284** 0.724*** 2.236***
Age 0.009 -0.022 -0.063 -0.022 -0.087* -0.107*
Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Married 0.044 -0.023 0.163 0.038 -0.034 0.140
Number of children -0.041 0.061 0.089 -0.024 0.086* 0.098
Residence authorization -0.170 -0.540*** -0.321* -0.177* -0.588*** -0.325*
Secondary level -0.226* -0.202 -0.127
Terciary level -0.014 -0.441** -0.120
Spanish language -0.099 -0.290* -0.001
Eastern Europe -0.626*** 0.040 -0.524 -0.602*** 0.002 -0.576*
Latin America -0.677*** -0.274 -0.575* -0.726*** -0.386 -0.608**
North Africa -0.386* 0.664** -0.028 -0.252 0.706** -0.023
Asia 0.013 -2.379*** -0.521 0.166 -2.160*** -0.447
Rest of the world -0.330 0.630 -0.274 -0.212 0.750** -0.257
Andalucía 0.378** 0.237 0.148 0.405** 0.255 0.132
Aragon 0.107 0.115 0.464 0.127 0.089 0.479
Asturias 0.656*** 0.629 0.182 0.685*** 0.607 0.204
Balears 0.415** 0.649*** 0.603** 0.423** 0.587** 0.577**
Canarias 0.505** 0.019 0.195 0.496** 0.006 0.159
Cantabria -0.143 0.510 0.106 -0.086 0.521 0.132
Castilla Leon 0.356* 0.214 0.507 0.398* 0.238 0.539
Castilla la Mancha 0.462** 0.628** 0.232 0.482** 0.687*** 0.243
Catalonia 0.342** 0.098 -0.200 0.339** 0.057 -0.210
Valencian Community 0.186 0.417* -0.016 0.156 0.420* -0.026
Extremadura 0.440 0.703* 0.535 0.442 0.749** 0.491
Galicia 0.655*** 0.815** 1.080*** 0.639** 0.824** 1.043***
Murcia 0.165 0.501** 0.442 0.232 0.514** 0.456
Navarra 0.056 0.239 -0.335 0.060 0.183 -0.346
Basque Country 0.123 0.597** 0.175 0.107 0.653** 0.141
Rioja 0.158 -0.186 0.112 0.212 -0.084 0.121
1. Moved once -0.831*** -0.334** -0.341 -0.845*** -0.378** -0.371*
2. More than one -1.423*** -0.287* -0.340 -1.442*** -0.346** -0.366*
Educational level attained (reference: primary level or less)
Internal mobility (reference: never moved)
Region of destination (reference: Madrid)
Region of origin (reference: Western Europe)
Key independent variables
Control variables
All controls No controls
Ommited: Employed in a different job
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Table 4 Multinomial regression (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First 
employment 
actual job
Unemployed Inactive
First 
employment 
actual job
Unemployed Inactive
Manager 1.775*** 0.425 0.798 1.541*** 0.377 0.886
Professional 0.164 0.155 0.658* 0.130 0.077 0.697*
Paraprofessional -0.291** -0.109 -0.007 -0.314** -0.119 0.008
Cualified workers 0.450*** -0.142 0.234 0.403*** -0.220 0.224
Industry 1.073*** 0.362 0.528 1.040*** 0.360 0.556
Construction 1.042*** 0.599** 0.579 1.009*** 0.597** 0.580
Trade 1.314*** 0.740** 0.535 1.238*** 0.666** 0.564
Hotel sector 0.986*** 0.787*** 0.991*** 0.930*** 0.763*** 1.012***
Transportation 1.020*** 0.085 0.223 0.925*** 0.028 0.203
Firm services 1.517*** 0.496 0.231 1.441*** 0.477 0.250
Education- Health 1.700*** -0.158 0.509 1.646*** -0.195 0.548
Household activities 1.008*** -0.169 -0.093 0.956*** -0.188 -0.060
Public administration 2.614*** 3.710*** 0.106 2.574*** 3.416*** 0.112
Time before finding the first job (less one 
month)
-0.226* 0.215 -0.270 -0.202* 0.254 -0.297
lambda2 (Heckman correction) -0.148 0.138 0.320 -0.085 0.111 0.355
Unemployed at origin -0.018 0.704*** -0.137
Student at origin -0.419** 0.332 0.256
Manager -1.232*** -0.153 -0.114
Professional -0.855*** -0.426* -0.269
Paraprofessional -0.842*** -0.401* -0.257
Skilled workers -0.773*** -0.629*** -0.321
Never worked at origin -0.504*** -0.265 -0.047
Constant 1.539** -0.775 -2.011* 1.178* 0.007 -1.527
Observations 6432 6432
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.145
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Last occupation in the country of birth (reference: unskilled worker)
Activity before migration
Sector of activity (reference: Agriculture)
First occupation (reference: unskilled occupation)
All controls No controls
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Table 5 Marginal effects 
 
 
 
 
  
First 
employment 
actual job
Different job Unemployed Inactive
First 
employment 
actual job
Different job Unemployed Inactive
Close ties (CT) -0.091*** 0.053* 0.003 0.035** -0.087*** 0.054 -0.004 0.038**
Network job (NJ) -0.079** 0.009 0.049** 0.021 -0.073** 0.006 0.044* 0.023
CT*NJ 0.083** -0.029 -0.014 -0.040** 0.079* -0.031 -0.006 -0.042**
Migrant proportion 0.199** -0.089 -0.043 -0.067 0.218** -0.106 -0.048 -0.064
Social participation in mixed 
organizations (SP) 
-0.124*** 0.057 0.060 0.007 -0.126*** 0.049 0.070 0.007
SP*years 0.023** -0.008 -0.015* -0.001 0.023** -0.006 -0.016** -0.001
Years since arrival (years) -0.049*** 0.040*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.003 0.006***
Female -0.008 -0.124*** 0.036*** 0.096*** -0.002 -0.131*** 0.038*** 0.095***
Age 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.010 -0.006 -0.004
Age^2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
Residence authorization -0.011 0.056*** -0.037*** -0.009 -0.011 0.061*** -0.041*** -0.009
Secondary level -0.032 0.042* -0.009 -0.001
Terciary level 0.011 0.025 -0.034** -0.002
Spanish language -0.010 0.027 -0.021* 0.003
Married 0.006 -0.009 -0.004 0.007 0.006 -0.007 -0.005 0.006
Number of children -0.010 0.000 0.005 0.004 -0.008 -0.004 0.007* 0.004
Eastern Europe -0.103*** 0.095** 0.024 -0.015 -0.098*** 0.096*** 0.020 -0.018
Latin America -0.102*** 0.117*** 0.000 -0.015 -0.109*** 0.132*** -0.008 -0.015
North Africa -0.086** 0.021 0.065** 0.000 -0.063* 0.000 0.065** -0.002
Asia 0.074 0.124* -0.188*** -0.010 0.095 0.093 -0.179*** -0.010
Rest of the world -0.071 0.021 0.062** -0.012 -0.054 -0.001 0.069** -0.014
Andalucía 0.057** -0.065** 0.008 -0.000 0.063** -0.070** 0.009 -0.001
Aragon 0.009 -0.032 0.004 0.019 0.013 -0.034 0.001 0.020
Asturias 0.095** -0.122*** 0.032 -0.005 0.101** -0.127*** 0.030 -0.004
Balears 0.046* -0.101*** 0.037** 0.018 0.050* -0.100*** 0.033* 0.017
Canarias 0.084** -0.073* -0.013 0.002 0.085** -0.071* -0.014 0.000
Cantabria -0.041 -0.007 0.044* 0.004 -0.031 -0.017 0.044 0.004
Castilla Leon 0.049 -0.070* 0.004 0.017 0.056 -0.079** 0.005 0.018
Castilla la Mancha 0.060* -0.097*** 0.037* 0.000 0.063* -0.104*** 0.042** 0.000
Catalonia 0.060** -0.045* -0.000 -0.015 0.061** -0.043 -0.003 -0.015
Valencian Community 0.021 -0.044 0.029 -0.006 0.016 -0.041 0.030* -0.006
Extremadura 0.050 -0.105* 0.041 0.014 0.050 -0.108** 0.046* 0.012
Galicia 0.077* -0.153*** 0.041 0.036** 0.075* -0.153*** 0.043 0.034**
Murcia 0.008 -0.057* 0.033* 0.015 0.020 -0.068** 0.033* 0.015
Navarra 0.008 -0.010 0.020 -0.018 0.011 -0.008 0.015 -0.018
Basque Country 0.003 -0.049 0.043* 0.003 -0.001 -0.050 0.050** 0.001
Rioja 0.031 -0.015 -0.020 0.004 0.038 -0.028 -0.013 0.003
1. Moved once -0.152*** 0.149*** 0.002 0.001 -0.156*** 0.156*** -0.000 0.000
2. More than one -0.253*** 0.225*** 0.021 0.008 -0.259*** 0.235*** 0.017 0.008
Region of origin (reference: Western Europe)
Region of destination (reference: Madrid)
Internal mobility (reference: never moved)
All Controls No controls at all
Educational level attained (reference: primary level or less)
Independent interest variables
Other independent variables
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Table 5 Marginal effects (cont.) 
 
First 
employment 
actual job
Different job Unemployed Inactive
First 
employment 
actual job
Different job Unemployed Inactive
Manager 0.286*** -0.276*** -0.019 0.009 0.249*** -0.249*** -0.017 0.017
Professional 0.015 -0.046 0.004 0.027* 0.011 -0.039 -0.002 0.030*
Paraprofessional -0.047** 0.044* -0.001 0.004 -0.052** 0.048** -0.001 0.006
Cualified workers 0.079*** -0.059** -0.025 0.005 0.074*** -0.049* -0.030* 0.006
Industry 0.169*** -0.173*** -0.003 0.007 0.166*** -0.172*** -0.002 0.009
Construction 0.157*** -0.181*** 0.017 0.008 0.153*** -0.180*** 0.018 0.009
Trade 0.200*** -0.223*** 0.021 0.002 0.192*** -0.214*** 0.017 0.004
Hotel sector 0.135*** -0.193*** 0.031 0.027* 0.129*** -0.188*** 0.031 0.029**
Transportation 0.171*** -0.145*** -0.022 -0.005 0.160*** -0.131** -0.024 -0.004
Firm services 0.246*** -0.230*** -0.002 -0.014 0.238*** -0.224*** -0.002 -0.012
Education- Health 0.293*** -0.231*** -0.062** 0.000 0.288*** -0.226*** -0.064** 0.003
Household activities 0.181*** -0.123*** -0.040** -0.018 0.175*** -0.118*** -0.041** -0.015
Public administration 0.355*** -0.527*** 0.227*** -0.055 0.359*** -0.515*** 0.208*** -0.053
Time before finding the first job 
 (less one month)
-0.049*** 0.013 -0.022 -0.014 -0.047** 0.007 -0.025* -0.015
lambda2 (Heckman correction) -0.035 0.005 0.014 0.016 -0.023 -0.003 0.009 0.017
Activity before migration
Unemployed at origin -0.021 -0.027 0.058*** -0.010
Student at origin -0.090*** 0.035 0.039** 0.017
Manager -0.126*** 0.094** 0.027 0.005
Professional -0.050* 0.061** -0.005 -0.006
Paraprofessional -0.049* 0.058** -0.003 -0.006
Cualified workers -0.030 0.061** -0.023 -0.008
Never worked at origin 0.089*** -0.081** 0.002 -0.010
Observations 6432 6432
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Last occupation in the country of birth (reference: unskilled worker)
First occupation (reference: unskilled occupation)
Sector of activity (reference: Agriculture)
All Controls No controls at all
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Table 6 Probability to participate in the Spanish labor market and with experience 
in the Spanish labor market. Women case 
 
 
 
Table 7. Test for normality of the residuals (CAMBIAR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE
 Close ties (CT) -1.457*** (0.160) -0.102 (0.069)
Age 0.450*** (0.056) 0.035* (0.019)
Age^2 -0.003*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Married -0.024 (0.063) 0.058 (0.050)
No. Childrens -0.754*** (0.095) -0.071*** (0.022)
Years since arrival (years) -3.218*** (0.357) -0.199*** (0.012)
Residence authorization -0.122 (0.079) -0.095* (0.056)
Eastern Europe -0.524*** (0.134) -0.313*** (0.104)
Latin America -0.708*** (0.139) -0.419*** (0.099)
North Africa -2.16*** (0.296) -0.177 (0.138)
Asia 4.123*** (0.478) 0.089 (0.210)
Rest of the world 5.443*** (0.646) -0.286 (0.227)
Manager -4.502*** (0.499) -0.408*** (0.145)
Professional -0.990*** (0.146) -0.173* (0.091)
Paraprofessional -1.436*** (0.179) -0.202** (0.083)
Cualified workers -1.524*** (0.201) -0.204** (0.101)
Never worked at origin 0.706*** (0.165) 0.061 (0.095)
Unemployed 0.426*** (0.100) -0.112* (0.067)
Household sector 1.247*** (0.159) 0.061 (0.050)
Constant -0.052 (0.363)
Observations 3486
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Semiparametric model Probit model
Chi2(2) = 14.2669 Chi2(2) =  3.4028
Prob > chi2 =    0.0008 Prob > chi2 =   0.1824
Men
Ho: Normality
Ha: No Normality
Lagrange Multiplier Test for Normality after Probit
Women
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Table 8. Wage regression. Women analysis 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wages per hour) 
 
 
  
QR 25 QR50 QR75 OLS
Key independent variables
Network job (NJ) 0.101* -0.003 -0.048 -0.062
 Close ties (CT) 0.108** 0.030 0.003 -0.012
CT*NJ -0.156** -0.033 0.018 0.015
Migrant proportion -0.248** -0.181 -0.073 -0.131
Social participation in mixed organizations (SP) 0.109 -0.008 0.094 0.067
SP*years -0.010 -0.006 -0.014 -0.000
Other controls 
Age -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
Age^2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Residence authorization 0.101*** 0.077* 0.081*** 0.087**
Years since arrival (years) 0.053*** 0.031 0.022 0.000
Secondary level -0.059 -0.042 -0.110 -0.049
Terciary level -0.032 -0.025 -0.083** -0.043
Spanish language -0.028 -0.006 0.024 0.011
Eastern Europe -0.021 -0.081 -0.107** -0.079
Latin America -0.100** -0.196** -0.225*** -0.162**
North Africa -0.099 -0.195* -0.323*** -0.255***
Asia -0.113 -0.329** -0.337*** -0.247*
Rest of the world -0.438*** -0.372** -0.332*** -0.369**
Andalucia -0.075 0.053 0.108* -0.014
Aragon -0.150*** -0.049 0.117* -0.007
Asturias -0.062 -0.034 0.092 -0.012
Balears 0.159*** 0.176** 0.185*** 0.132**
Canarias 0.096 0.105 0.166** 0.103
Cantabria -0.137* -0.116 0.023 -0.093
Castilla Leon -0.091 -0.068 0.033 -0.043
Castilla la Mancha -0.127** -0.028 0.003 -0.153**
Catalonia 0.199*** 0.171*** 0.181*** 0.169***
Valencian Community -0.087* -0.034 0.066 -0.070
Extremadura -0.040 -0.044 -0.070 -0.080
Galicia -0.113 -0.063 -0.001 -0.087
Murcia -0.025 0.025 0.106* 0.000
Navarra 0.077 0.081 0.218*** 0.104
Basque Country 0.040 0.139 0.091 0.062
Rioja 0.131** 0.052 0.027 0.044
Educational level attained (reference: primary level or less)
Region of origin (reference: Western Europe)
Region of destination (reference: Madrid)
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(Tabla 8 Cont.) 
 
 
  
QR 25 QR50 QR75 OLS
Manager 0.092 0.084 0.504*** 0.265**
Professional 0.347*** 0.360*** 0.458*** 0.326***
Paraprofessional -0.028 0.037 0.010 -0.031
Cualified workers -0.158** -0.164 -0.073 -0.124
Industry 0.016 0.015 -0.003 -0.060
Construction 0.235* 0.031 0.058 0.076
Trade 0.128* 0.018 0.026 0.061
Hotel sector 0.084 -0.018 0.056 0.024
Transportation -0.069 -0.116 0.314*** 0.108
Firm services -0.042 0.014 0.208*** 0.076
Education- Health -0.048 -0.024 0.084 0.008
Household activities -0.194*** -0.130 0.007 -0.140*
Public administration 0.008 -0.063 -0.044 -0.021
Internal mobility (reference: never moved)
1. Moved once 0.014 -0.018 -0.046 0.011
2. More than one 0.039 -0.020 -0.101*** -0.020
Time before finding the first job  (less one month) 0.080**   0.065 0.059*   0.031 
Heckman correction -0.010* 0.001 0.005 -0.002
Constant 2.792*** 3.121*** 3.296*** 3.153***
Observations 912 912 912 912
Adjusted R2 0.186
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Actual occupation (reference: unskilled occupation)
Sector of activity (reference: Agriculture)
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Table 9 QR and OLS for men 
 
Dependent variable: ln(wages per hour) 
 
  
QR 25 QR 50 QR 75 OLS
Independent Interest variables
Network job (NJ) -0.136* -0.116*** -0.102 -0.169***
Close ties (CT) -0.123* -0.122*** -0.099 -0.158***
CT*NJ 0.076 0.074*** 0.066 0.144**
Migrant proportion -0.065 -0.189*** -0.197 -0.044
Social participation in mixed organizations (SP) -0.006 -0.094*** -0.006 0.014
SP*years 0.000 0.031*** 0.007 0.020
Other controls 
Age 0.013 0.018*** 0.002 0.012
Age^2 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
Residence authorization 0.017 0.043*** 0.073 0.077**
Years since arrival (years) 0.026 0.020*** 0.011 0.011
Secondary level 0.017 -0.001 0.039 0.035
Terciary level 0.070 0.094*** 0.093** 0.135***
Speaks spanish 0.073 0.069*** 0.043 0.051
Eastern Europe -0.078 -0.095*** -0.150** -0.113*
Latin America -0.144 -0.149*** -0.210*** -0.157**
North Africa -0.173* -0.218*** -0.327*** -0.239***
Asia -0.157 -0.220*** -0.318*** -0.253***
Rest of the world -0.227 -0.244*** -0.371*** -0.317***
Andalucia 0.044 -0.021 0.039 0.008
Aragón 0.047 -0.071*** -0.030 -0.046
Asturias -0.012 -0.043 0.014 -0.089
Balears 0.105 -0.017 0.044 0.053
Canarias 0.072 -0.052** 0.058 0.015
Cantabria -0.070 -0.148*** -0.061 -0.227**
Castilla Leon -0.028 -0.155*** -0.141* -0.100
Castilla la Mancha 0.029 0.025 0.010 -0.041
Catalonia 0.136** 0.096*** 0.077 0.050
Valencian Community 0.016 0.031 0.011 -0.013
Extremadura -0.263** -0.179*** -0.199* -0.073
Galicia -0.409*** -0.351*** -0.243** -0.278***
Murcia 0.093 -0.006 0.005 -0.018
Navarra 0.144* 0.075*** 0.049 0.061
Basque Country 0.031 -0.105*** -0.089 -0.122
Rioja 0.151 0.045* 0.078 0.051
Educational level attained (reference: primary level or less)
Region of origin (reference: Western Europe)
Region of destination (reference: Madrid)
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Table 9 (Cont.) 
 
 
QR 25 QR 50 QR 75 OLS
Manager 0.388*** 0.407*** 0.464*** 0.402***
Professional 0.365*** 0.327*** 0.437*** 0.383***
Paraprofessional 0.079 -0.057*** 0.001 0.040
Cualified workers 0.081* 0.054*** 0.046 0.070**
Industry -0.016 0.058*** 0.065 0.044
Construction 0.098 0.184*** 0.167*** 0.107**
Trade -0.098 0.054*** 0.104 -0.039
Hotel sector -0.077 0.124*** 0.058 -0.073
Transportation 0.021 0.149*** 0.265*** 0.149*
Firm services 0.048 0.192*** 0.147* 0.085
Education- Health -0.089 0.126*** 0.245*** 0.098
Household activities -0.182 -0.142** -0.329* -0.211
Public administration -0.183 -0.115** -0.101 -0.311*
Time before finding the first job  (less one month) 0.087** 0.065*** 0.170*** 0.138***
1. Moved once 0.032 0.010 -0.054 -0.029
2. More than one 0.064 0.035 -0.073 -0.029
Heckman correction -0.099 -0.090 0.135 0.047
Constant 2.834*** 2.931*** 3.161*** 2.933***
Observations 862 862 862 862
Adjusted R2 0.346
Internal mobility (reference: never moved)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Actual occupation (reference: unskilled occupation)
Sector of activity (reference: Agriculture)
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 Database elaboration 
 
 
 
Graph 1. Evolution of the new immigrants in Spain by year of arrival 
 
Dropped observations Total
Total sample 15441
Missing Age/ not recorded 41
Missing Year of arrival/ not recorded 212
Missing Years of residence/ not recorded 1
Subtotal 15187
Subsample - Data restricted to:
Year of arrival>1996 5226
Age between 14 and 65 years 242
Age at arrival (between 14 and 56 years) 411
Not finish studies in Spain 595
Missings 241
Country before migrarion: country of birth 1095
Inactives (retired) / Missings 241
Subtotal 7377
Without labour experience in Spain 945
Final Subsample 6432
0
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300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
Immigrants (millions)
Source: ENI (2007)
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Table A.2 Definition of independent variables 
 
 
Female
Man
Age
Age^2
Years since arrival
Married
Number of children
Residence authorization
Education level attained (dummies variables)
Primary level
Secondary level
Tertiary level
Language
Speaks spanish
Region of origin
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Latin America
North Africa
Asia
Rest of the world
1 if the respondent has tertiary level complete or incomeplete; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent declares having spanish as her mother tongue or, if she states 
can speak Spanish ‘well‘ or ‘very well‘; 0 otherwise
1 if country of birth is in Western Europe; 0 otherwise
1 if country of birth is in Eastern Europe; 0 otherwise
1 if country of birth is in Latin America; 0 otherwise
1 if country of birth is in North Africa; 0 otherwise
1 if country of birth is in Asia; 0 otherwise
1 if country of birth is in Oceania, rest of Africa, ; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent is married; 0 otherwise
Number of daughters and sons
0 otherwise
1 if the respondent has primary level attained or less; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent has secondary level complete or incomeplete; 0 otherwise
1 if the respondent declares having any of the following documents:
    Permanent residency authorisation; temporary residency authorisation, EU 
residence permit (except in the case of Romanian and Bulgarian workers who, 
despite being EU citizens could not become legally contracted workers in Spain 
temporarily at the time of the survey); refugee status or assylum application. 
This cathegory also includes immigrants whose nationailty is Spanish, from 
other EU member state (excluding Bulgaria and Romania) or from non-EU 
members of thr Free Trade Association (i.e., Lichtenstein, Iceland, Switzerland 
and Norway);
1 if respondent is a woman; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent is a man; 0 otherwise
Age in years
Age square
Years
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Table A.2 (Cont.) 
 
Migration between municipalities. Frecuency (%)
1. Never moved
2. Moved once
3. More than one
Motives for migration
Labor 
Family regrouping
Social networks
Contacts at arrival (Close ties)
Social participation in mixed organizations
Migrant proportion
Network job
Formal job
Social participation in organizations exclusive for 
immigrants
0 otherwise
immigrant assistance organizations specifically to foreigners,
associations and sports clubs specifically targeting foreigners,
educational and cultural groups specifically targeting foreigners,
religious organizations and groups specifically targeting foreigners,
other groups specifically targeting foreigners;
1 if respondent has found the job through family and friends; 0 otherwise
Proportion of immigrants of the same country of birht living in the same 
Autonomous Community on the total immigrant population in the Autonomous 
Community (%)
1 if respondent declares family regrouping; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent has contacts at arrival; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent participates in: 
1 if respondent participates in: 
0 otherwise
1 if respondent has found the job through State and private employment 
agencies, newspapers  ´advertisements, union hiring halls as well as school and 
college placement services; 0 otherwise
   NGO s´
   Political organizations, unions, or neighborhood activities,
   Religious groups,
   Sport clubs, educational and cultural groups,
   Other social groups;
1 if respondent declares moved because being unemployed in the country of 
origin or declares looking for a better job; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent declares have lived in the same municipality since arrival; 0 
otherwise
1 if respondent declares have lived in two different municipalities; 0 otherwise
1 if respondent declares have lived in more than two different municipalities; 0 
otherwise 
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Table A.2 (Cont.) 
 
 
Sector of activity
Agriculture
Industry
Construction
Trade
Hotel sector
Transportation
Firm services
Education- Health
Household activities
Public administration
    Education,
    Health and veterinary activities, social service,
    Other social and community services, personal services;
Agriculture, Hunting, and Forestry
Fishing,
Minning;
Manufacture industries,
1 if respondent' first job is in: 
0 otherwise
1 if respondent' first job is in: Household activities;
0 otherwise
1 if respondent' first job is in: Public administration, defense and compulsory 
social security;
0 otherwise
0 otherwise
1 if respondent' first job is in:
0 otherwise
1 if respondent' first job is in Construction;
0 otherwise
1 if respondent' first job is in: Trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
and personal articles and electronic products for household;
0 otherwise
1 if respondent' first job is in: Hotel sector;
0 otherwise
1 if respondent' first job is in: Transport, storage and communications;
0 otherwise
1 if respondent' first job is in:
Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water;
Financial intermediation 
Real estate, renting and business services;
1 if respondent' first job is in:
0 otherwise
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Table A.2 (Cont.) 
 
Occupation 
Manager
Paraprofessional
Skilled workers
Unskilled workers
   Administrative workers,
   Workers in catering services, personal services, protection
   services, and  comercial salers;
   Qualified workers in  fishing and agriculture activities.
   Craftsmen and skilled manufacturing, construction, and mining, except plant         
and machinery operators.
1 if respondent declares: 
   Technical and scientific professionals and intellectuals,
   Technicians and associate professionals;
1 if respondent declares: Unskilled occuppation;
0 otherwise
1 if respondent declares: Management of companies and public administrations; 
0 otherwise
0 otherwise
1 if respondent declares:
0 otherwise
1 if respondent declares:
0 otherwise
Professional
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Table A.3 Occupational mobility between actual occupation and last occupation in 
the country of origin 
 
 
Manager ProfessionalParaprofessionalQualified workersUnskilled workers Total
Manager 11.2 9.1 27.5 16.7 35.5 100
Professional 1.7 20.0 30.5 11.2 36.7 100
Paraprofessional 0.9 3.5 38.7 10.0 46.9 100
Qualified workers 0.1 1.2 11.4 39.5 47.7 100
Unskilled workers 0.1 1.0 16.8 13.0 69.1 100
Total 1.3 5.9 25.3 19.7 47.8 100
Manager 59.5 10.8 18.9 5.4 5.4 100
Professional 6.9 60.3 25.2 3.1 4.6 100
Paraprofessional 7.0 17.4 55.7 4.4 15.7 100
Qualified workers 1.3 6.7 17.3 62.7 12.0 100
Unskilled workers 0.0 13.3 23.3 16.7 46.7 100
Total 10.3 28.9 32.0 16.2 12.6 100
Manager 3.4 9.0 32.8 18.1 36.7 100
Professional 1.0 14.8 36.3 12.0 35.8 100
Paraprofessional 0.4 2.4 43.5 9.3 44.4 100
Qualified workers 0.0 1.4 12.9 41.3 44.4 100
Unskilled workers 0.3 0.3 23.6 12.5 63.4 100
Total 0.6 5.0 31.5 18.2 44.7 100
Manager 8.1 8.1 16.2 13.5 54.1 100
Professional 0.5 8.4 20.3 10.9 59.9 100
Paraprofessional 0.8 1.1 24.6 12.2 61.4 100
Qualified workers 0.2 0.4 9.4 39.0 51.2 100
Unskilled workers 0.0 0.6 9.5 11.8 78.1 100
Total 0.6 2.0 15.4 23.3 58.7 100
Manager 0.0 5.9 23.5 23.5 47.1 100
Professional 0.0 10.8 24.3 24.3 40.5 100
Paraprofessional 0.0 5.2 18.2 15.6 61.0 100
Qualified workers 0.0 0.6 7.8 28.5 63.1 100
Unskilled workers 0.0 0.8 5.7 14.5 79.0 100
Total 0.0 2.5 11.1 21.7 64.8 100
Manager 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
Professional 6.3 18.8 31.3 12.5 31.3 100
Paraprofessional 0.0 3.3 63.3 10.0 23.3 100
Qualified workers 0.0 4.0 36.0 16.0 44.0 100
Unskilled workers 0.0 5.9 11.8 5.9 76.5 100
Total 1.1 6.8 39.8 11.4 40.9 100
Manager 0.0 12.5 12.5 37.5 37.5 100
Professional 0.0 50.0 0.0 16.7 33.3 100
Paraprofessional 0.0 7.7 23.1 12.8 56.4 100
Qualified workers 0.0 0.0 7.1 40.5 52.4 100
Unskilled workers 0.0 0.0 12.8 18.0 69.2 100
Total 0.0 8.9 12.3 24.0 54.8 100
Actual occupation in SpainLast occupation in 
the origin country
Region
Total sample
Developed 
countries of 
Europe
Latin 
America
Eastern 
Europe
Asia
Rest of the 
world
North 
Africa
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